The Dodd-Frank Act's "skin-in-the-game 
INTRODUCTION
Securitization provides the financing for the majority of consumer credit, 1 but it has come under great scrutiny in the wake of the 4 Id. § 941, 124 Stat. at 1890-96 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11). The definition of the 5% risk retention is left up to regulatory implementation. See id. There are also to be a number of exceptions to the skin-in-the-game requirement, including a significant one for "quali- ON REG. 155, 158-61 (2012). 6 Id. at 161. 7 See id. at 161, 167-68. 8 See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257, 1263-68 (2009). It bears emphasis that securitization can create moral hazards unrelated to credit risk. To illustrate through a personal example, I recently purchased a car. I was prepared to pay in cash, but the dealer offered a lower purchase price if I took out dealer financing instead. When I inquired about upfront fees or prepayment penalties, I was told that there were none.
The only way in which a lower purchase price for a financed car than for a cash-purchased car makes sense is if the dealer anticipated being able to securitize the loan, meaning the assetbacked securities ("ABS") investors pay for both the sale and the financing. Here, the dealer had the knowledge that I was a significant prepayment risk-I was prepared to pay in cash, and I specifically inquired about whether I could prepay immediately with no penalty. The ABS investors, however, lack that information and would price their purchase of the loan based on me being a standard, rather than an unusual prepayment risk. The dealer was thus looking to sell
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[Vol. 81:813 game requirement "is that if the parties engaged in securitization are required to retain some credit risk on the securitized loans, they will be incentivized to ensure that the securitized loans are of higher quality." 9 Skin-in-the-game is thus meant to serve as a moral hazard mitigant.
This Article questions whether the Dodd-Frank Act's analysis of skin-in-the-game is correct. 10 It does so through an examination of credit card securitization, a context in which contractual credit risk retentions requirements of 4% to 7% skin-in-the-game have long been in place. 11 In so doing, this Article observes that skin-in-thegame should actually have incentivized riskier underwriting in the credit card space by encouraging rate-jacking-the phenomenon of a credit card issuer abruptly increasing cardholder account fees or interest rates, including on existing balances. 12 Rate-jacking makes the returns on credit card loans more volatile; while it can increase the yield, it can also result in a default by the borrower. 13 For investors in credit card asset-backed securities ("ABS")-essentially bonds backed by the cash flows from credit card receivables-increased volatility is a negative; for credit card issuers, however, increased volatility is a positive.
Credit card ABS investors are fixed-income investors. 14 This means that their maximum return is capped at the promised yield on the ABS, so they do not benefit from the potentially greater returns due to rate-jacking. Instead, they only receive the downside risk of greater defaults.
what it knew was a high prepayment risk loan at a standard prepayment risk price, demonstrating that securitizers can capitalize on information asymmetries unrelated to credit risk. 9 See Levitin, Pavlov & Wachter, supra note 5, at 161. 10 Elsewhere, with economists Andrey Pavlov and Susan Wachter, I have argued that skinin-the-game is hardly failsafe given the myriad examples, including in 2008, of portfolio lenders failing, not to mention the collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which held 100% of the credit risk on the mortgages they securitized (excluding any private mortgage insurance on loans with loan-to-value ratios ("LTVs") greater than 80% 
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For credit card issuers, however, rate-jacking is quite attractive. Credit card securitization structures transfer most downside credit risk on the card balances to the ABS investors; the card issuer only retains a small portion of the downside. 15 The card issuer, however, retains the entire potential upside-if the card balances generate more income than is necessary to pay the ABS investors, it is all kept by the card issuer. 16 With 100% of the upside, and just a fraction of the downside, card issuers have the economic equivalent of a "collar" of a call option (unlimited upside) and a put option (limited downside) on the card receivables. Per the Black-Scholes option pricing model, all else being equal, an option's value increases with the price volatility of the reference asset.
17
Rate-jacking is the key to controlling the volatility of credit card receivables, and credit card securitization lets card issuers retain the ability to rate-jack existing balances. Credit card securitization structures transfer card balances to (formerly) off-balance-sheet securitization trusts, 18 but allow the credit card issuers (banks) to retain control over the terms of the card account. This allows card issuers rather than the ABS investors to control rate-jacking. Thus, credit card securitization structures give issuers the ability to manufacture increased volatility of credit card receivables, which in turn increases the value of the issuer's interests in the securitization, at the expense of ABS investors who do not share in the upside of increased volatility.
Rate-jacking has been generally prohibited for consumer credit cards under the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (the "Credit CARD Act").
19 While rate-jacking was a major factor contributing to the passage of the Credit CARD Act, the real mystery is why there was not more rate-jacking given the incentive misalignment between card issuers and ABS investors.
The answer, this Article argues, lies in features of credit card securitization other than its formal contractual skin-in-the-game re- 15 See infra Part I.A. 16 FDIC MANUAL, supra note 13, at 39-40. 17 See infra note 200 and accompanying text. 18 An accounting change in 2010 brought most credit card securitization trusts back on balance sheet. See Press Release, Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., supra note 1.
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 81:813 quirement. The implication of this is that skin-in-the-game is not in fact the panacea it is held out to be in the Dodd-Frank Act. It can simply create a different kind of moral hazard, depending on the other features involved in a securitization. Requiring skin-in-the-game for all types of securitizations is potentially counterproductive. Credit card securitization did not produce the same disastrous results as unregulated mortgage securitization because it has never been a true credit risk transfer mechanism. Instead, there has always been strong implied recourse on credit card ABS, meaning that card issuers have implicitly guaranteed 100% payment on credit card ABS. 20 Put differently, rather than a very limited amount of skin-in-the-game formally required by contract, credit card securitization functionally involves 100% skin-in-the-game. Credit card securitization eliminates, rather than mitigates moral hazard.
Securitization provides a critical funding source for the largest card issuers. Large card issuers exist in a symbiotic and interdependent relationship with their securitization conduits. Absent their securitization conduit, card issuers would be strapped to find sufficient liquidity to fund their credit card lending, and without the card issuer, the securitization conduits would automatically wind down. Card issuers do not wish to jeopardize their ability to tap capital markets for funding their loans by imposing excessive losses on investors in credit card ABS. As a result, card issuers are careful in monitoring credit quality and are not incentivized to overly exploit information asymmetries between themselves and ABS investors by transferring credit risk. Indeed, this seems to explain why rate-jacking did not become a much more rampant phenomenon.
The result is that card issuers' rate-jacking involves a careful threading of the needle; a small increase in card receivables' volatility from rate-jacking could result in increased profits, but if the volatility increases too much, there is too great a risk of losses that will bring down the securitization conduit. This may explain why card issuers rate-jacked within limits-interest rates were never raised from 13% to 1300% or even 130% or 65% APR, but more commonly from 13% to 30%. 13/senate-rejects-limit-oncredit-card-interest-rates/ (noting that credit card interest rates were at the highest 41% and that 1/3 of card holders were subject to rates between 20% and 41%).
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The experience of credit card securitization suggests that attempts to reform the mortgage securitization market by requiring skin-in-the-game-retention of credit risk by loan originators and/or securitizers-such as that mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act, 22 are unlikely to provide a sufficient guarantee of quality in securitized assets. 23 Instead, credit card securitization seems to have avoided the problem of declining underwriting standards because there is implied recourse to card issuers' balance sheets, rather than because of its formal skin-in-the-game requirements.
This Article adds to the legal literature on securitization. While a large body of literature has sprung up about mortgage securitization, the literature on credit card securitization is almost nonexistent. The scant legal literature focuses on its taxation, not on credit risk and underwriting incentives, 24 and the equally scant finance literature focuses on the concerns of implicit recourse. 25 Credit card securitization shows the variety of structures that can exist in the securitization world and the variety of business uses for securitization. While securitization can be a mechanism primarily to transfer credit risk, it can also function primarily as a liquidity provision mechanism. This Article provides an overview of credit card securitization, its legal framework, and the incentive structures it creates.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I begins with a brief discussion of securitization in general and its potential to produce either "lemons" or "cherries"-lower-or higher-than-average-quality assets. It then turns to a detailed explanation of how credit card securitization works and how that differs from the securitization of other asset classes. Part II lays out an option volatility explanation for rate-jacking. Part III considers some of the factors that might limit the power of an option volatility explanation of rate-jacking. 22 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 23 See Levitin, Pavlov & Wachter, supra note 10, at 167-68 (discussing limitations of skinin-the game risk retention as a method of controlling default risk). 24 
I. CREDIT CARD SECURITIZATION
A. Securitization in a Nutshell
Securitization is a financing mechanism based on segregating selected cash flows of a firm from the firm's liabilities. 26 This segregation of cash flows from liabilities enables financing based solely on the risks inherent in the selected cashflows, rather than in the risks of the firm overall. This means that firms with high quality cash flows but significant liabilities can raise funds at costs set solely on the quality of the cash flows. 27 For example, a petroleum company with excellent cash flows but major environmental liabilities might be able to borrow directly at high cost based on the total picture of its assets and liabilities. It can finance itself at a much lower cost, however, through securitization, where the financing is priced based solely on the strength of securitized assets, separate from the firm's liabilities. 28 The segregation of cash flows in a securitization is accomplished by transferring them to a specially created entity, which pays for the cash flows by issuing securities against them. 29 The special entity needs to be bankruptcy remote, meaning here that its assets cannot be consolidated with the firm's assets in the event the firm files for bankruptcy or is taken into receivership. 30 This process allows investors to invest based solely on the quality of the cash flows and the risks specific to them, rather than the overall risks of the firm.
31
Securitization transactions are extremely complex and heterogeneous, but they all have a basic common structure. 32 A financial institution (the securitization "sponsor") owns a pool of receivables, such as credit card loans, car loans, or mortgages, which it either generated itself ("originated") or purchased. 33 Instead of holding these receiv-26 FDIC MANUAL, supra note 14, at 9-10. 27 See id. 28 
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ables (and the credit risk, interest rate risk, and liquidity risk) on its own books, it sells them as part of an integrated, multi-step transaction.
34
First, the loans are sold to a special-purpose subsidiary of the sponsor (the "depositor") that has no other assets or liabilities. 35 The sale is made to isolate the loans from the sponsor's assets and liabilities, making the assets bankruptcy remote. 36 Second, the depositor sells the loans to a passive special-purpose vehicle ("SPV"), usually a trust.
37 This is to protect against asset substitution risk, as the sponsor could effectuate a transformation in the subsidiaries' assets. The SPV must be a stand-alone entity; it cannot be a subsidiary of the sponsor or the depositor, or it would be consolidated with them for accounting and U.S. tax purposes.
38
The SPV then issues certificated securities (essentially bonds) to raise the funds to pay the depositor for the loans. 39 The depositor uses this money to pay the sponsor for the loans. 40 Because the certificated securities are collateralized by the assets owned by the trust, they are called asset-backed securities. 41 The SPV must be essentially passive for a variety of reasonscredit risk, accounting, and tax; "it is little more than a shell to hold 34 35 See FDIC MANUAL, supra note 14, at 9-10; Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 34, at 1082-83. 36 See FDIC MANUAL, supra note 14, at 9-10; Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 34, at 1082-83. 37 See FDIC MANUAL, supra note 14, at 9-10; Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 34, at 1082-83. The trustee will then typically convey the mortgage notes and security instruments to a "master document custodian," who manages the loan documentation, while the servicer handles the collection of the loans. See Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J.
ON REG. 1, 14 n.35 (2011). The trust will also often take steps to perfect a security interest in the assets it has purchased in the event that the sale is characterized as a secured loan. See id. 38 See FDIC MANUAL, supra note 14, at 9-10, 14-15; Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 34, at 1085-86. Under SFAS 166 and 167, as of January 1, 2010, the SPV may still be consolidated with the sponsor/depositor if the sponsor/depositor retains either the upside or downside exposure on the SPV's assets and exercises control over the SPV's assets. 39 See FDIC MANUAL, supra note 14, at 9-10. Often the SPV issues the certificates to the depositor, which then transfers them to an underwriting affiliate. 40 See id. 41 See id. at 9. If the assets are residential or commercial mortgage loans, they are called, respectively, residential mortgage-backed securities or commercial mortgage-backed securities. Home equity loan securitizations are by industry practice referred to as ABS. See Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 34, at 1080 n.13.
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[Vol. 81:813 the receivables and put them beyond the reach of the creditors of the financial institution." 42 Yet receivables need to be managed. Billing statements must be mailed and payments collected. A third party thus must be brought in to manage the loans (the "servicer"). 43 The servicer is supposed to manage the loans for the benefit of the ABS holders.
44
Securitization thus separates the beneficial ownership of the loan from legal title to the loan and from the management of the loans. The SPV (or more specifically its trustee) holds legal title to the loans, passive ABS investors are the beneficial owners of the loans, and the servicers manage the loans as agents of the trust. 45 The servicer provides the critical link between borrowers and the SPV and ABS investors, and servicing arrangements are an essential part of securitization.
46
Securitization represents a division of economic interest in a firm (the securitization vehicle) from the governance of the firm (including its initial acquisition of assets and its management thereof). Securitization thus sets up another manifestation of what Professors Henry Hu and Bernard Black term the "empty voting" problem, which can lead to governance decisions that are not in the best interest of the economic owners of a firm.
47
Securitization can also result in either "lemons" or "cherries" problems. A lemons problem means that there is adverse selection of the assets that are securitized. 48 The securitization sponsor retains the low-risk assets and securitizes the high-risk ones. Lemons markets 42 See Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 34, at 1081-86. 43 
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should self-implode once buyers recognize that it is a lemons market, but do not necessarily do so immediately, as the mortgage bubble illustrated. A cherries problem is the inverse. The securitization sponsor cherry picks the low-risk, best assets for securitization and retains the high-risk assets, potentially increasing the risks for direct investors in the sponsor.
49
Whether securitization produces lemons or cherries is fundamentally a matter of market arbitrage between a first-party insurance market (retaining the assets) and a third-party insurance market (selling the assets). I use the term "insurance" here loosely, simply meaning the bearing of risk. For any particular set of receivables, the decision whether to securitize or retain on balance sheet is based on whether the cost of the "insurance" is lower on balance sheet or off balance sheet. This is not simply a matter of whether the securitization market is underpricing or overpricing risk, although that is a factor. It is also a matter of the idiosyncratic costs of retaining the assets on balance sheet.
B. Credit Card Securitization
Credit card receivables have historically been the second largest class of securitized assets behind home mortgages (including home equity loans and lines of credit). 
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Nature of the Securitized Assets
Credit card securitization is structured differently than mortgage (or auto loan) securitization because of the differences in the nature of the securitized assets. Credit card receivables have very short lives; they tend to be paid off within less than a year, far more quickly than a mortgage or auto loan. 56 Moreover, a credit card is a revolving line of credit with relatively little amortization required; minimum payments tend to be around 2% of the outstanding balance. 57 The cardholder will repeatedly draw down and repay on the line of credit, whereas most mortgages and auto loans are fully amortized installment loans. 58 Finally, as Fitch Ratings has noted, "Credit cards are unique among consumer loans, in that issuing entities have the ability to change terms on the underlying obligations rapidly and selectively."
59 Thus, as Deutsche Bank has observed: In the world of investing, credit card ABS are unique because credit card lending itself is unique. Unlike virtually any other consumer lender, a credit card company may, unilaterally, change the risk/reward relationship of its business at any time. For the most part a credit card lender can increase yield on its existing portfolio by changing the financing rate charged, as well as by changing late fees, overlimit fees, annual fees, all of which can be quite significant. The lender can reduce risk by closing accounts or preemptively lowering a cardholder's credit line. Moreover, credit card companies conduct constant and automated surveillance of daily purchase activity (how much, how often, and where individual cardholders are spending money); a borrower's activity with other lenders can also be monitored through regular updates from the various credit bureaus. Relative to any other type of consumer lender, the credit card lender in many ways has a better and more current understanding of a borrower's creditworthiness, and greater flexibility to respond to changes as they occur. Credit card securitization involves the securitization solely of the receivables, not of the accounts themselves. 61 The card issuer retains the account, which lets it retain the customer relationship and also the ability to change the terms of the account without the trust's permission. 62 Because credit card securitization is only of the receivables, not the accounts, the servicer is always the card issuer that originated the loans, and which retains the on-going account relationship.
Goals of Credit Card Securitization
Credit card securitization is mainly done by a handful of very large and sophisticated financial institutions. While there have been securitizations done by dozens of issuers, a handful account for the vast majority of the ABS issuance market. 63 Most credit card issuers do not securitize their card receivables. While there are over 300 card issuing banks in the United States, the top ten issuers make up over 85% of the credit card market in terms of receivables outstanding, 64 and all ten of those issuers securitize at least some of their receivables. 65 65 See Calomiris & Mason, supra note 25, at 1 ("Some banks financed the vast majority of the credit card receivables they originated with off-balance-sheet finance, while others . . . retained all of the receivables they originated, financing them with bank equity and debt as they would other types of bank loans."). Credit card securitization is primarily a funding, liquidity, and regulatory capital arbitrage mechanism for card issuers. While it does effectuate some shifting of credit and interest rate risk, that role is much less pronounced than in mortgage securitization. 67 Credit card issuers need reliable, inexpensive funding in order to make credit card loans. Securitization fills that need by enabling card issuers to tap capital markets for funding, rather than relying on deposits.
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68 Securitization thus links capital market funders with consumer borrowers. Because structured securities enable ABS deal sponsors to tailor their offering to investor preferences and offer securities with pass-through tax status, financing via ABS may be cheaper than financing through corporate debt, where there is a double level of taxation. Credit card securitization also provides steady liquidity for card issuers. Under the unique structure of credit card securitization, discussed in more detail infra, the principal repayments on receivables are used to purchase more receivables from the card issuer for the securitization trust. 70 This design means that there is a ready flow of liquidity to the card issuer, similar to a rolling series of securities issuances via shelf registration, rather than a lumpy burst of liquidity from individual securities offerings.
71
Prior to 2010, securitization also moved credit card receivables off the balance sheets of card issuers, thus freeing the issuers from the regulatory requirement of maintaining minimum equity capital in proportion to their risk-weighted assets. 72 As credit card receivables have 100% risk weighting, 73 they are particularly costly assets to keep on a balance sheet. By moving card receivables off their balance sheets, issuers were able to reduce their regulatory capital requirements, which enabled issuers to effectively increase their leverage and thus their return on equity.
A change in GAAP accounting rules that went into effect in 2010 brought most securitized credit card receivables back on banks' balance sheets. 74 Statements of Financial Accounting Standards 166 and 167 require on-balance-sheet treatment of assets over which a firm maintains control to affect their performance and for which a firm also maintains either (or both) upside and downside exposure. 75 As regulatory capital requirements key off of accounting rules, this meant that the regulatory capital arbitrage gains from credit card securitization disappeared, and banks had to bring billions of dollars of ABS back onto their balance sheets and hold regulatory capital and loan loss reserves against them. 76 Citigroup, for example, consolidated assets and liabilities worth about $137 billion and $146 billion, respectively, as a result of the accounting change, mostly from credit card securipurposes. Lee, supra note 24, at 113. This tax treatment allows card issuers "to deduct a portion of the money paid to investors as interest under [26 U.S.C. § 163 (2006) 
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tizations. 77 This resulted in Citigroup having to hold another $800 million in regulatory capital and $13.4 billion in loan loss reserves.
78 As we will see, the sponsor's liability for credit risk on securitized assets and not simply for representations and warranties is a fundamental feature of credit card securitization (but not mortgage securitization).
Master Trust Structure
Credit card securitization began in 1986-fifteen years after the start of modern mortgage securitization and nine years after the first private-label mortgage securitization deal 79 -with a deal by Bank One. 80 Early credit card securitization deals were relatively similar to mortgage or auto loan securitizations in that a set of receivables were sold to a discrete or stand-alone common law trust that issued securities against them. 81 After the receivables were paid off or charged off, the trust was shut down.
A stand-alone trust could issue securities tranched into a seniorsubordinate structure, but every new series of securities required a new, separate pool of assets, and there could be considerable performance variation between trusts based on vintage and market conditions.
82 These stand-alone, one-shot trusts were supplanted in 1991 with a new structure that was better suited to the short life of credit card receivables-the master trust. 78 Id. The $800 million figure is derived by applying the 8% standard regulatory capital requirement to "$10 billion of additional risk weighted assets" cited in the call transcript. See id. 79 82 See FITCH IBCA, supra note 56, at 2-3. 83 Id. More recent credit card securitization structures involve owner trusts, master owner trusts, or issuance trusts. These structures are used in part to ensure ERISA eligibility for more of their securities, see infra note 105, but also because they allow much greater flexibility in securities issuance by enabling the delinkage of seniority and maturity. As discussed below in more detail, credit card securitizations always use a senior-subordinate structure for their securities as a form of credit enhancement. The chief advantage of a master trust over a stand-alone owner trust is that the master trust structure enables the issuance of numerous series of securities at different times from one trust using an S-3 shelf registration statement. 84 All of these series of securities "rely on the same pool of receivables as collateral." 85 Because a master trust allows for the repeated issuance of different securities against the same pool of receivables, it enables a cheaper and more efficient source of "evergreen" funding for issuers than stand-alone trusts. 86 When an issuer seeks more financing, it can convey more receivables to the trust's pool and issue additional securities rather than having to set up a new securitization. 87 The cost of "issuing a new series from a master trust is lower than creating a new trust for every issue," and the sunk costs of setting up the trust are amortized over repeated issuances.
88
From the investor standpoint, a master trust also has certain advantages. Master trust pools are "larger and not as subject to seasonal or demographic concentrations" in the same way a stand-alone trust is. 89 Thus, a master trust might have credit card receivables from 2008, 2009, and 2010, whereas stand-alone trusts would only have receivables from one of those years. 90 There is an accompanying risk, however, for investors-the makeup of a master trust's assets may change significantly over time as new receivables are added and as the cardholder base for those receivables changes. 91 position. If a junior position tranche matures before a senior tranche, the senior tranche loses its credit support. Yet it might well be advantageous to a sponsor to have a trust issue shorter-term subordinated notes with maturities that do not match the senior tranches.
One solution to the maturity and subordination mismatch is to use what is known as a "TRAP"-a "titanium rapid accumulation of principal." MARY E. KANE, CITIGROUP INC., CREDIT CARD ABS PRIMER 19 (2004). The reason for the name is unclear, but a TRAP is a defeasance device that permits the substitution of cash collateral for a subordinated tranche. Id. If the subordinated tranche pays off before the senior tranches, the trust may substitute a cash account for the subordinate tranche to continue to provide equivalent subordination support for the senior tranches. See id. at 19-21. "Trapping" enables the delinked issuance of senior and junior tranches with different maturities, thereby giving the trust (and sponsor) tremendous flexibility regarding issuance so as to capitalize on market demand. See id.
84 FITCH IBCA, supra note 56, at 2-3. 85 Id. at 2. 86 See id. at 3. 87 Id. 88 Id. 89 Id. 90 See id. at 2-3. 91 Typically, rating agencies must approve major changes to the pool. Twenty percent annual and fifteen percent quarterly triggers are common. See FITCHRATINGS, supra note 57, at 15, 25-26. 
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The Seller's Vertical Interest and Excess Spread
A critical difference between a credit card securitization and an auto loan or mortgage securitization is that all credit card securitizations require what is known as a "seller's interest," a "seller's participation," a "transferor's interest," or the "notional amount."
92 The seller's interest is an untranched, undivided "vertical" slice, or participation, of the securitization trust owned by the card issuer. 93 The seller's interest ranks pari passu with the "investors' interest" vertical slice of the trust. 94 The seller's interest, however, "is allocated all dilutions (balances canceled due to returned goods) and fraudulently generated receivables." 95 Most credit card ABS deals mandate a minimum 7% seller's interest, 96 although sometimes it is as low as 4%.
97
The seller's interest is a device designed to align the interests of the card issuer with the ABS investors.
98 By itself, it would perform that function. The seller's interest, however, is not the only interest the card issuer has in the securitization trust. It also retains the "excess spread"-essentially the residual interest in the trust.
99 Excess spread-sometimes referred to as "credit enhancing, interest-only securities" ("CEIOS")-is the monthly revenue that is left over after all payments to investors (including the seller's interest) and the servicing fee have been paid. 100 Thus, if a trust has assets that yield 20% but experience a 3% default rate, and the trust has issued ABS with a 10% coupon and pays a 2% servicing fee, the excess spread is 5%.
Credit card ABS require the maintenance of a minimum level of excess spread. 101 Mandatory excess spread levels are one of the primary credit enhancements used for credit card securitization.
102 Re- 92 See FITCH IBCA, supra note 56, at 3; FDIC MANUAL, supra note 14, at 11. 93 See FITCH IBCA, supra note 56, at 3; FDIC MANUAL, supra note 14, at 11. 94 See FDIC MANUAL, supra note 14, at 11. 95 FITCH IBCA, supra note 56, at 3. 96 See id. 97 See FITCHRATINGS, supra note 57, at 14 (noting that the requirement is "often in the range of 4%-7%"); see also Chase Issuance Trust, Prospectus (Form 424B3) 71, 91 (Feb. 1, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/869090/000119312511020189/d424b3. htm (defining early amortization as including the "Transferor Amount" going beneath the "Required Transferor Amount Percentage," set at 4%).
98 FITCH IBCA, supra note 56, at 3. 99 See FDIC MANUAL, supra note 14, at 39-40. 100 See id. 101 See id. This requirement is not statutory, but instead seems to derive from rating agency requirements. 102 See id. [Vol. 81:813 quiring excess spread ensures that there is more revenue coming into the trust than is needed to pay its obligations. 103 As we will see, excess spread and seller's interest interact in ways that reduce the effectiveness of the seller's interest in aligning incentives. Figure 4 shows the master trust securitization structure. 
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Credit Enhancements
Excess spread is only one of several varieties of credit enhancements, many of which are commonly found in the same credit card ABS trust structure. These credit enhancements are critical for the deal because most credit card ABS investors want to invest only in investment grade (or ideally AAA-rated) securities. 104 Many large institutional investors are restricted to investing only in so-called ER- 103 See id. 104 See FITCH IBCA, supra note 56, at 6 (explaining that in severe depression scenarios, properly structured "AAA" ratings "should repay investors 100% of their original investment plus interest).
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ISA-eligible securities, which means debt securities have received an investment-grade rating. The ABS Underwriter Exemptions require, inter alia, that to be exempt, the certificates acquired by an ERISA plan have one of the two highest generic rating categories from a credit rating agency (AAA or AA); that the certificates not be subordinated to other series issued by the ABS trust; and that the certificates have at least 5% credit support via subordination. See, e.g., Fleet Bank (R.I.) Nat'l Ass'n (Fleet), 64 Fed. Reg. at 53,737-38; Citibank (SD), N.A., 63 Fed. Reg. at 17,027-29; MBNA Am. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 63 Fed. Reg. at 17,021-22. This situation complicates efforts to sell the residual tranche of a securitization.
One solution is to use a "note issuance trust" structure. See Lee, supra note 24, at 123-24. This structure, enabled by 2001 changes to GAAP that permit sale treatment of securitization transactions where SPVs issue notes rather than "certificates," involves two trusts. Id. First, a master trust issues not only its regular series, but also a junior series represented by a collateral certificate (or a "collateral invested amount" ("CIA")) that is equivalent to a series. See FITCHRATINGS, supra note 57, at 15-16. That collateral certificate is placed into a second trust that issues notes against the cashflows from the collateral certificate. See id. The second trust's notes are not backed by the receivables directly, but by the collateral certificate (a participation in the receivables), so these notes qualify as debt for ERISA purposes because they are not a direct, undivided beneficial interest in an underlying pool of receivables. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(b) (defining "equity interest" as "any interest in an entity other than an instrument that is treated as indebtedness under applicable local law and which has no substantial equity features"); FITCHRATINGS, supra note 57, at 15-16. The notes represent a fixed obligation to pay a fixed amount, rather than a pass-through certificate. The result is that the lowest tranche is fully-
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Credit card receivables by themselves would be unlikely to produce an investment grade rating. 106 They are simply unsecured consumer debt.
107
With the various credit enhancements that are common in structured financial products, however, risky, unsecured consumer debt can be transformed into AAA-rated securities.
108 Beyond requiring the maintenance of a minimum level of excess spread, a variety of other credit enhancements are frequently used for credit card ABS.
First and foremost is contractual subordination among investors. This can be subordination between series or subordination of classes via a senior-subordinate tranching.
109 A common structure for credit card trusts is to have an A, a B, and a C tranche, with a seller-retained excess spread ("XS") tranche junior to them.
110
Credit support via subordination can be increased by the issuance of additional junior debt. For example, in 2008-2009, major card issuers had their securitization trusts issue new subordinated debt, which the issuers then purchased in order to provide more credit support to the existing ABS investors, so as to maintain investor confidence in the asset class during the financial crisis as card defaults mounted.
111
A second common credit enhancement is overcollateralization. The trust can be funded with receivables whose principal balance is greater than that owed on the ABS. 112 Overcollateralization provides a cushion against cardholder defaults by ensuring that the post-default collections will be sufficient for the trust to pay on the ABS.
113
Credit card ABS also sometimes use a cash collateral account ("CCA") as a credit enhancement. 114 A CCA is a separate, prefunded cash account that can cover shortfalls in net yield over coupon and servicing fee. 115 The CCA is often funded (for a fee) by a third party bank that only gets paid back once all other certificates are retransferrable without ERISA fiduciary liability issues. The issuance trust structure also adds greater overall flexibility, as it can issue additional subordinate series without issuing additional senior series or vice-versa. See Lee, supra note 24, at 123-24. 106 
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paid. 116 Historically, letters of credit were used for the same purpose, but they did not offer as much protection as a pre-funded account, since they included the credit risk of a third-party.
117
Other credit enhancement devices are the "collateral invested amount" ("CIA") (also known as the "CA investor interest," the "collateral interest," the "enhancement invested amount," or the "'C' tranche") 118 and the triggered diversion of excess spread. The CIA is a subordinated, "uncertificated, privately placed ownership interest in the trust." 119 The CIA is junior to all investor certificates, but senior to the XS tranche, so it has no guaranteed subordination support (as there need not be any excess spread in a particular month), but it is paid before any funds trickle down into the excess spread account.
120
Should "excess spread drop below [certain] defined levels," then the trust may be required to "fund a cash reserve account."
121 This triggered diversion of excess spread allows the CIA tranche to build up some protection when risk levels increase. As excess spread declines, however, it takes more time to fill up the cash reserve. 122 The CIA is essentially a penultimate, credit-enhancing tranche senior to the excess spread tranche that serves as an additional buffer against loss for the more senior ABS.
Finally, in master trust structures there can be shifting internal credit support between series of securities. A master trust may be, depending on how the trust structure apportions collections and shortfalls, "socialist" or "nonsocialist."
123 In a nonsocialist trust, payments and shortfalls are "allocate[d] based on each series' pro rata share" of face amount outstanding. 124 In a socialist master trust, collections and shortfalls are allocated across the securities issued by the trust "based on the combined needs of" the securities. 125 Thus, in a socialist trust, each security provides some potential credit support for the trust's other securities. 116 
See id.
117 FITCH IBCA, supra note 56, at 6. 118 Id. 119 Id. 120 
121 KANE, supra note 83, at 17; see also FITCHRATINGS, supra note 59, at 10. 122 KANE, supra note 83, at 17. 123 FITCHRATINGS, supra note 59, at 11. Sometimes these are referred to as "socialized" and "nonsocialized" trusts. 124 Id. 125 Id.
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[Vol. 81:813 Nonsocialist trusts are the more common form. Some of the largest card issuers, however, use socialist trusts. 126 A socialist master trust has the benefit of being able to support higher coupon rates because of its ability to shift collections between series, but an early amortization event, -essentially a default by the trust, as discussed below 127 -will apply to all series of securities issued by a socialist trust, whereas early amortization could be limited to one series in a nonsocialist trust. 
Structuring for Short-Duration Assets
Credit enhancements play an important role in credit card ABS, as they do in other classes of structured financial products. What makes credit card ABS unique is that they involve the securitization of extremely short duration assets. 129 The nature of the assets involved necessitates a peculiar design for credit card ABS that in turn makes the requirement of maintaining sufficient excess spread particularly important to investors.
Credit card securitization master trusts are designed to issue securities that mimic the payment structure of a traditional bond, in which monthly interest payments are followed by a "bullet" payment of principal at the maturity date.
130
While this structure largely removes prepayment (convexity) risk-aside from that associated with "early amortization," a prepayment triggered by a credit eventcredit card ABS do not have a fixed maturity date; they merely have an "expected" maturity date.
131
The average life of credit card receivables is quite short relative to other assets, but it is also unpredictable within a substantial range (six to twelve months).
132
If credit card ABS were merely passthrough securities, in which investors would receive payments on their securities as payments were received by the trust on the receivables, the result would be quick, but unpredictable and often lumpy repayments-exactly what fixed-income investors do not want. 133 Instead, investors want longer and more predictable repayments.
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The challenge for credit card ABS structuring is to match the duration of the receivables with that of the ABS. In order to transform short-duration credit card receivables into longer-duration bonds, credit card ABS channel cash flows on the receivables in different ways during different periods of an ABS's lifetime to create artificially delayed amortization. 135 Credit card ABS initially apply principal payments of receivables to acquire more receivables, while interest payments on the receivables cover interest payments on the ABS. 136 Then, after a fixed period of time, the ABS are amortized on a fixed schedule.
137
Credit card ABS begin with a "revolving" period, which covers an initial set period of a credit card ABS's lifetime, typically two to eleven years. 138 At this stage, only payments of interest are made to investors. 139 All of the receivables the trust manages to collect are divided into "finance charge income and principal payments." 140 The portion of the receivables that represents finance charges (interest and fees) is used to cover investors' monthly interest coupons, the issuer's fee for servicing the receivables, and any credit losses from chargeoffs.
141
Remaining funds from finance charges represent excess spread, which is released to the issuer. 142 The portion of the receivables that represents principal, however, is used by the trust to acquire more card receivables. 143 Should there be insufficient receivables that can be purchased, the seller's interest is bought down until the funds for reinvestment are exhausted or the seller's interest becomes so low that it trips an early amortization trigger. 144 This early amortization risk "gives the seller adequate incentive to maintain the seller's participation at a level well above the [mandated] minimum [percentage] ." 145 Following the revolving period, the master trust enters into either a "controlled amortization" or "controlled accumulation" period. When controlled amortization is used, the principal balance on the ABS is usually paid off in twelve monthly payments using principal collections from the receivables. 147 Controlled accumulation also amortizes the principal over a relatively short period, but instead of principal repayment being made to investors on a monthly basis, payments are put into a sinking fund (called a principal funding account) until the targeted maturity date is reached, at which point they are released as a balloon payment of principal. 148 In controlled accumulation, interest payments on the ABS remain unchanged during the controlled accumulation period, as the principal has not been paid down; however, for controlled amortization, monthly interest payments are reduced as the principal is reduced.
149
As controlled amortization proceeds, the investors' interest declines and the sellers' interest increases until the investors' interest is paid off. 
Asset Substitution Risk and Early Amortization
The short duration of credit card receivables combined with the revolving period structure of credit card ABS provide credit card ABS investors with an ability to limit their risk that is not available to other types of ABS or mortgage-backed securities ("MBS") investors. Other types of ABS and MBS are funded with a set of receivables upon their creation and are stuck with this set of receivables.
151 Because the receivables are fixed, there is no risk of asset substitution, but there is also no chance for the investors to bail if there are assetclass-wide problems, other than by selling the ABS or MBS.
Credit card ABS investors, in contrast, face a built-in asset substitution risk, as the trust is buying more card receivables during the revolving period. 152 Thus, the quality of the assets held by the trust can decline over time. The credit card ABS investors, however, are not without protection from degradation in asset quality through asset substitution. If the assets do not perform up to certain defined thresholds or other risk factors emerge, the revolving period terminates and the trust instead moves into an accelerated amortization of the outstanding ABS.
153 Instead of the "principal" portion of payments on the card receivables being used to buy new receivables, all payments 147 Id. 148 for the trust will be breached, and those accounts that are transferred will likely be of lower quality, as high quality accounts are likely to switch issuers. 178 Thus, although early amortization is designed as an investor protection, it creates potential adverse selection problems that can undercut its effectiveness.
II. AN OPTION-PRICING EXPLANATION OF RATE-JACKING
A. Rate-Jacking
Rate-jacking provides a window into the incentives created by skin-in-the-game arrangements in credit card securitization. Ratejacking occurs when a credit card issuer suddenly raises the interest rates or fees on an account. 180 These new rates and fees are often applied retroactively to existing balances.
181
Rate-jacking functions as a re-underwriting of a revolving line of credit without the borrower's concurrent consent to the new terms.
182
It can be triggered by contractually specified conditions, such as a payment default, but typically the ability to increase rates has been simply reserved to the discretion of the card issuer as part of its right to unilaterally change the account terms "at any time, [for] any reason."
183
Rate-jacking could thus be triggered by perceived changes in a particular cardholder's risk profile or for reasons related to the overall portfolio management and liquidity needs of the card issuer.
184
The Credit CARD Act severely curtailed card issuers' ability to rate-jack consumer cardholders.
185 Rate-jacking may "largely be a weighted average default rate of 12% and a total yield of 8%. The total yield is less than the 10% promised (there is no excess spread), so the trust will have a shortfall of $2 million. The issuer will incur only part of this loss. The issuer will incur a pro rata loss on its 10% seller's interest, so it will lose $0.2 million. It will also bear the first $0.3 million loss of the investor interest's $1.8 million in losses. The investors will themselves incur a loss of $1.5 million. And for that month, there will be no excess spread. Situation C thus produces losses of $2 million, but only $0.5 million are borne by the card issuer. Now let us suppose that there is a 50% chance that rate-jacking results in Situation B and a 50% chance it results in Situation C. If so, the net present value of rate-jacking is 0.5 * B + 0.5 * C. With the numbers we are using that would be 0.5 * $3 million + 0.5 * -$0.5 million, so the net present value of the rate-jack would be $1.25 million, making rate-jacking a net present value positive activity for the card issuer.
Obviously, the profitability of rate-jacking depends on the precise impact the rate-jack has on default rates. With different numbers or different probabilities, rate-jacking might be more or less appealing, and we do not know what sort of interest rate increase will result in what sort of net gain or loss to portfolio yield as a generic matter, much less for any particular portfolio in any particular set of economic conditions. Instead, the point here is simply to note that credit card securitization can create perverse incentives for the card issuer despite the presence of significant skin-in-the-game through the retention of the seller's interest and subordinated positions. Skin-in-the-game merely lessens the misalignment of interests between the securitizer and investors; it does not eliminate the misalignment if the securitization leaves the securitizer with imbalanced upside and downside risk.
III. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE OPTION-PRICING EXPLANATION
There are several potential problems with an option-pricing theory of rate-jacking, reviewed below in turn.
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A. First Loss Positions
In many securitizations, card issuers retain first loss positions.
204
Even if their total exposure is limited, they bear the initial loss caused by defaults. This first loss position operates like a deductible on an insurance policy and is designed to align the incentives of the issuer/ servicer with the ABS holders in order to alleviate the principal-agent moral hazard. 205 First loss positions thus help correct the risk/reward imbalance by concentrating the risk for the issuer. It is impossible to determine as a general matter card issuers' first loss exposure in securitizations, but the existence of any first-loss exposure is a critical factor limiting the benefits of rate-jacking to the issuer.
B. Implicit Recourse
Likewise, even if card issuers formally have limited exposure on their securitizations, there is still implicit recourse, which means the market expects that card issuers will support their securitization trusts, even though they are off balance sheet. Because of the critical liquidity and funding role played by securitization for credit card issuers, 206 the relationship between the issuer and its securitization trust is a symbiotic one in which neither can survive without the other. Every card issuer whose securitization trust has collapsed has itself ended up in receivership. 207 Because of this close relationship, there has long been a concern about card issuers implicitly guaranteeing their off-
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SPV's bankruptcy remoteness is significant vis-à-vis liability heavy auto manufacturers. Figure 5 shows a comparison of coupons on Ford auto loan ABS and Ford Motor Credit's bonds from 2005-2010. The bond coupons are consistently a couple of hundred of basis points higher than the ABS coupons. Although Figure 5 is meant to be purely illustrative and makes no attempt to control for various factors that might affect this spread, it does underscore that ABS at least appear to be a significantly cheaper financing method than unsecured bonds for auto manufacturers. Auto manufacturers are thus loathe to soil their ABS market with lemons and thereby lose this much cheaper source of funding.
214
214 Auto loan ABS usually are done as one-shot owner trust issuances. That means that unlike credit card ABS, auto loan ABS sponsors cannot support a deal by adding additional collateral or by causing additional junior, credit-enhancing tranches to be issued, which they then purchase. Instead, auto loan ABS provide increasing credit enhancement through sequential pay structures whereby senior tranches are paid off before payments are made on junior tranches. TED GOGOLL, STANDARD & POOR'S, DESPITE RISING DELINQUENCIES AND LOSSES, U.S. AUTO LOAN ABS REMAINS STABLE 3 (2007), http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/ media/despite_rising_delinquencies.pdf. As time goes on, the ratio of junior bonds outstanding to senior bonds outstanding increases, meaning that there is increasing credit support. 
C. Not All Credit Card Debt Is Securitized
If rate-jacking is such an effective tool for issuers, why do card issuers not securitize all of their receivables? Part of the answer is that there is likely a downward sloping demand curve for credit card ABS. If issuers put too much product on the market, the profitability of securitization would decline, and at some point securitization would be less attractive than balance sheet financing.
The other part of the answer might be that while only 45% of card debt may be securitized at any moment, a much higher percentage is eventually securitized. 216 Often accounts are "seasoned" for several months before the receivables are securitized. This provides a way of weeding out the accounts that will never pay at all, particularly fraudulently opened accounts that issuers are required to purchase out 215 The chart compares the coupons on Ford Motor Credit Co. LLC's Senior Unsecured Bonds with the coupons on Ford Credit Auto Owner Trust's ABS. No adjustment has been made to the data, which are from Bloomberg. 216 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE G.19 (Mar. 7, 2011). Accounting changes in the first quarter of 2010 have resulted in most credit card receivables being carried on issuers' balance sheets, even though they are formally securitized for bankruptcy and tax purposes. See supra Part I.B.2. The 45% figure refers to the years preceding this change. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra.
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of securitizations. 217 (This is analogous to "early payment default" warranties in mortgage securitization, where mortgages that default within the first few months or year after origination must be repurchased by the securitizer. 218 ) Although seasoning would seem to work against securitization, investors are well aware of the potential lemons problem in securitization, and seasoning is a way to assuage this concern.
D. ABS Investors Demand a Compensating Premium for RateJacking
It is possible that markets recognize the risk imbalance in credit card securitization and that there is a risk premium for this, either in the form of higher coupons on credit card ABS or lower purchase price on the ABS. There are good reasons, however, to doubt that the principal-agent risk in rate-jacking is properly priced by the market. There is also good reason to believe that even if the market does price for the moral hazard, it will be unlikely to prevent the hazardous behavior.
First, it is difficult to gauge the extent of the imbalance beforehand because ABS purchasers do not know what percentage of a securitization will be retained by the issuer. The issuer's retention of a deal will vary over time depending on the market for its ABS and its funding needs. Moreover, to the extent that an issuer appears to be retaining risk, investors cannot be sure that this risk is not fully or even overly hedged.
Second, gauging the extent of the risk imbalance is difficult as a general matter; there is a major information asymmetry between ABS holders and the issuer. The issuer knows if it is doing rate-jacking and how frequently, while the ABS holders do not. 219 Monitoring is basically impossible for investors, as the issuer/servicer controls all of the information. Moreover, monitoring is impractical. The costs of monitoring account-level decisions on small-balance accounts like credit cards greatly outweigh the benefits. Given this situation, it is unlikely that the market prices correctly. It might underprice, but it might also overestimate the risk imbalance and demand too high a premium.
